

RESETTLEMENT

*Uprooting and Rebuilding Communities in
Newfoundland and Labrador and Beyond*

EDITED *by*

ISABELLE CÔTÉ *and* YOLANDE POTTIE-SHERMAN



ISER Books

© 2020 Isabelle Côté and Yolande Pottie-Sherman

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, without the prior written consent of the publisher.

LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA CATALOGUING IN PUBLICATION

Title: Resettlement : uprooting and rebuilding communities in Newfoundland and Labrador and beyond / edited by Isabelle Côté and Yolande Pottie-Sherman.

Other titles: Resettlement (St. John's, N.L.)

Names: Côté, Isabelle, 1981- editor. | Pottie-Sherman, Yolande, 1984- editor.

Series: Social and economic papers ; no. 37.

Description: Series statement: Social and economic papers ; no. 37 |

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20200277006 | Canadiana (ebook)

20200277200 | ISBN 9781894725682 (softcover) | ISBN 9781894725811

(EPUB) | ISBN 9781894725835 (PDF)

Subjects: LCSH: Migration, Internal—Newfoundland and Labrador. | LCSH:

Migration, Internal. | LCSH: Newfoundland and Labrador—Social conditions.

Classification: LCC HB1990.N4 R47 2020 | DDC 304.809718—dc23

Cover image: “Resettlement” by Kumi Stoddart

Cover design: Alison Carr

Page design and typesetting: Alison Carr

Copy editing: Richard Tallman

Published by ISER Books

Institute of Social and Economic Research

Memorial University of Newfoundland

PO Box 4200

St. John's, NL A1C 5S7

www.hss.mun.ca/iserbooks/

Printed in Canada

26 25 24 23 22 21 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

CONTENTS

<i>List of Figures</i>	vii
<i>Contributors</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xiii

INTRODUCTION

1. Resettlement in Newfoundland and Labrador in Comparative Perspective	I
<i>Yolande Pottie-Sherman, Isabelle Côté, and Rebecca LeDrew</i>	

PART I: RESETTLEMENT IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR

2. Development's Travelling Rationalities: Contextualizing Newfoundland Resettlement	43
<i>Tina Loo</i>	
3. Not Just Pawns in a Board Game: Local Actors in the Fisheries Household Resettlement Program	79
<i>George Withers</i>	
4. Should We Stay or Should We Go? Mobility, Immobility, and Community Closure in Newfoundland and Labrador, 2009–2018	III
<i>Isabelle Côté and Yolande Pottie-Sherman</i>	

**PART II: RESETTLEMENT IN GREENLAND, IRELAND,
AND CANADA'S ARCTIC**

5. Resettlement, Urbanization, and Rural–Urban Homelessness Geographies in Greenland	143
<i>Julia Christensen and Steven Arnjford</i>	
6. Non-State Actors and Resettlement in Reverse: The Case of Rural Resettlement Ireland	181
<i>Hannah Barry and Isabelle Côté</i>	
7. Climate Resettlement in Canada's Arctic	223
<i>Nicole Marshall</i>	
 <i>Index</i>	 259

LIST OF FIGURES

- 2.1 Newfoundland and Labrador communities that sent and received resettled people, 1965–1975
- 2.2 Robert Wells, Department of the Attorney General, discussing resettlement with Diver [Dover] residents, August 1961
- 2.3 Communities affected by resettlement in eastern Quebec
- 3.1 Main communities of Placentia Bay affected by the Fisheries Household Resettlement Program
- 4.1 Newfoundland and Labrador communities that applied for relocation under 2009 and 2013 Community Relocation Policies
- 5.1 Greenland's main regions
- 6.1 Media analysis coding distribution
- 6.2 Family questionnaire used by Rural Resettlement Ireland
- 6.3 Irish counties where families resettled as of 2006

CONTRIBUTORS

STEVEN ARNFJORD holds a Ph.D. in Sociology and is currently an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Greenland in Nuuk, Greenland. He has published extensively on social policy, social work, housing insecurity and homelessness, and the history of social welfare in Greenland. Dr. Arnfjord also leads NoINI, an advocacy group for people living without housing in Nuuk, Greenland.

HANNAH BARRY holds an International Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree in Political Science and Communication Studies from Memorial University of Newfoundland. To date, she has largely focused her work on African affairs, completing fieldwork in both Ghana and Tanzania. Academically, her specializations include the politicization of food during armed conflict and the role that corruption plays in the protraction of civil war. Originally from St. John's, Hannah now lives in Zimbabwe, where she works as a Junior Professional Consultant with the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP).

JULIA CHRISTENSEN is an Associate Professor in Geography and a Canada Research Chair in Northern Governance and Public Policy

at Memorial University of Newfoundland in St. John's. She has published extensively on northern and Indigenous housing and social determinants of health, including her 2016 edited volume with University of Manitoba Press, *Indigenous Homelessness: Perspectives from Canada, Australia and New Zealand* and her 2017 book with University of British Columbia Press, *No Home in a Homeland: Indigenous Peoples and Homelessness in the Canadian North*.

ISABELLE CÔTÉ is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Memorial University of Newfoundland. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Toronto and was a postdoctoral fellow at KITLV (Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies) in Leiden. Her research investigates the role of demographic factors in general, and internal migration in particular, on intra-state conflict and contentious politics in East and Southeast Asia and more recently in Western democracies. She has co-edited *People Changing Places*, a volume on "Sons of the Soil" conflict (Routledge, 2018).

REBECCA LEDREW is an M.A. student in Geography at Memorial University. Her expertise is in the field of human geography, with a particular interest in the socio-cultural aspects of sustainability, urban and rural planning, heritage, and adaptive reuse. She is currently working on her thesis, which focuses on peripheral stories of the circular economy and for which she recently completed research in Canada, the Netherlands, and Scotland.

TINA LOO is a historian at the University of British Columbia, where she teaches and writes about the environment and Canada. A member of the Royal Society of Canada, she is the author of a

number of award-winning books and articles about subjects ranging from wildlife conservation and the impacts of hydroelectric development to forced relocation in Canada. She has also written for *Canada's History* (formerly *The Beaver* magazine) and is co-editor of the *Canadian Historical Review*. Her most recent book is *Moved by the State: Forced Relocation and Making a Good Life in Postwar Canada* (University of British Columbia Press, 2019).

NICOLE MARSHALL is an SSHRC postdoctoral fellow in political theory at the University of Toronto. Anticipating the loss of a series of small island states to rising sea levels, her current work explores the concept of political loss for climate migrants, particularly as it relates to the continuation of citizenship and rights outside of the traditional state. She completed her Ph.D. at the University of Alberta where her research mapped international law, migration policy, and the ethics of climate migration.

YOLANDE POTTIE-SHERMAN is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at Memorial University of Newfoundland and a specialist in the study of human migration. She completed her Ph.D. in Geography at the University of British Columbia, and was a postdoctoral fellow in Geography at Dartmouth College. Her research centres on the political economy of migration, community change, and local responses to migration, particularly in the American Rust Belt and Atlantic Canada. She also co-leads the Adaptive Cities and Engagement Space, a research collective at Memorial University promoting social justice and inclusivity in smaller cities and communities.

Contributors

GEORGE WITHERS was born in Rock Harbour, an isolated Placentia West inshore fishing community of 150 souls. He graduated from Memorial University with a B.Ed. (1969), B.A., (1972), M.Ed. (1983), M.A. (2009), and Ph.D. (2016). He began a high school teaching career at Bell Island and St. John's, and retired from Prince of Wales Collegiate in 1999. At age 59 he enrolled in graduate school and fulfilled a dream of completing a doctorate in history.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Research for this book was supported by a Harris Centre Applied Research Grant and by the Smallwood Foundation at Memorial University. We are also grateful for the support of the office of the Vice President (Research) at Memorial University, which provided funding through the Scholarship in the Arts program, as well as Memorial's Publication Subvention Program to aid in the publication of the present work.

Special thanks to ISER Books academic editor Fiona Polack, managing editor Alison Carr, and copy editor Richard Tallman, who helped bring our manuscript to fruition. We also thank Rebecca Wilton, Mira Raatikainen, Lauren Onsom, Rachel Lutz, Hannah Barry, and Rebecca LeDrew for their work as research assistants on this project, and Charlie Conway for providing cartographic support. We also wish to thank Hannah Loeder for her help with the index and Philip Hiscock for his advice on the spellings of place names.

We gratefully acknowledge the permission to reprint material that was previously published. Parts of Isabelle Côté and Yolande Pottie-Sherman's Chapter 4 appeared in Côté and Pottie-Sherman, "The Contentious Politics of Resettlement Programs: Evidence from

Acknowledgements

Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 1 (2020): 19–37 and are reprinted with permission.

Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to the contributors who provided helpful comments on the project’s direction at the “Resettlement in Global Context Symposium” held in St. John’s at the Atlantic Political Science Studies Association conference in October 2018. It has been a true pleasure to collaborate with such a generous and insightful group of scholars.

CHAPTER 1

Resettlement in Newfoundland and Labrador in Comparative Perspective

YOLANDE POTTIE-SHERMAN,
ISABELLE CÔTÉ, *and* REBECCA LEDREW

COMMUNITIES DEBATE CLOSURE

In February of 2019, the remote community of Little Bay Islands off the northern coast of the island of Newfoundland voted unanimously in favour of resettlement.¹ After years of decline, the permanent shuttering of the town's crab processing plant (and major employer) had galvanized debate about its viability. The vote was the last and final step of the provincial government's Community Relocation Policy: in December of 2019, essential services to the community were cut, with each resident to receive a buyout package of \$250,000 (\$270,000 for families). The process has been long and controversial, and a previous vote on the matter in 2015 had failed by less than half a percentage point. Opinions on the Community Relocation Policy (CRP) have been bitterly divided in Little Bay Islands and Newfoundland and Labrador more broadly, with some viewing the resettlement of isolated communities as

an absolute necessity for both the provincial economy and the welfare of its rural citizens, and others seeing it as a coercive dismantling of outport culture.²

Contemporary resettlement projects around the world are contending with many of the same issues raised in Little Bay Islands. In January of 2017, residents of Isle de Jean Charles, Louisiana, were also considering the terms of their resettlement. Having lost 98 per cent of its land area in the last 50 years, the state of Louisiana identified the narrow island in the Gulf of Mexico as a “resettlement zone.”³ The Isle de Jean Charles resettlement project represents the culmination of a process that has unfolded over two decades, as Indigenous groups on the island have asserted claims for tribal recognition and environmental protection from the state of Louisiana and the United States federal government.⁴ This voluntary resettlement project has been contentious. Some residents do not want to leave or are unsure about relocating, and commentators have criticized the state government’s efforts to meaningfully involve all residents of the island in the process.⁵ The cost and slow nature of the relocation process have also raised questions concerning the government’s financial commitment to resettlement.⁶ Its projected cost is \$100 million — well beyond the US\$48 million allocated by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development. Popular media have labelled the community as abandoned by the “first climate change refugees,” a narrative that ignores the layered vulnerabilities facing Isle de Jean Charles, including oil exploration, out-migration, and the failure of the federal government to recognize tribal sovereignty.⁷

Though these two contexts are very different, they involve common issues: how can resettlement projects — whether led by state actors or communities — meaningfully include the people

affected by them? How can we reconcile the layers of mobility and immobility that may engender rifts within communities debating relocation? Perhaps most importantly, the real cost of resettlement goes far beyond the monetary value of the assets left behind. What is the true cost of resettlement and how can resettlement debates be reframed to recognize the social and cultural importance of places? This book takes up these questions by examining resettlement projects in Newfoundland and Labrador in critical, comparative perspective.

THIS BOOK

Our goal here is to place Newfoundland and Labrador's ongoing experiences with resettlement in conversation with the broader field of resettlement studies. This field of study focuses on the dynamics of planned population movements, and takes stock of the causes and consequences of resettlement programs as well as the actors and policies involved.⁸ As a starting point, we employ Vanclay's definition of resettlement as:

the comprehensive process of planning for and implementing the relocation of people, households, and communities from one place to another for some specific reason, together with all associated activities, including: (a) provision of compensation for lost assets, resources, and inconvenience; and (b) the provision of support for livelihood restoration and enhancement, re-establishment of social networks, and for restoring or improving the social functioning of the community, social activities and essential public services.⁹

In other words, resettlement is a process that begins before and continues long after communities or individuals move. It is distinct from other forms of relocation because it involves relatively permanent, organized movement by an entire community.¹⁰ Ideally, too, resettlement involves appropriate compensation and the mechanisms and resources for those who are uprooted to start anew or rebuild communities elsewhere.

In this introductory chapter, we start with a brief overview of Newfoundland and Labrador's resettlement experience before advocating for a critical, comparative approach to resettlement studies in order to better understand the multi-dimensional agendas that underlie resettlement projects, their governance structures, their potential benefits and harms, as well as their global span. Next, we highlight the four overarching themes of this edited volume: (1) the layered, historical legacies of colonialism, dispossession, and (re)resettlement; (2) the agency and legitimacy of the various actors involved in resettlement schemes, including government officials, academics, religious leaders, and non-state actors; (3) resistance and resilience; and (4) the role of resource and extractive development in resettlement. We conclude with an overview of the book.

RESETTLEMENT IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR

Resettlement in Newfoundland and Labrador officially refers to the government-sponsored relocation of rural settlements that began in 1954, five years after Newfoundland joined the Canadian Confederation.¹¹ These programs aimed at centralizing its rural population and stimulating economic growth. From 1954 to 1977,

under the leadership of Joseph R. Smallwood, resettlement programs in Newfoundland and Labrador involved the relocation of some 29,614 individuals (or 4,094 households) to 77 “growth centres.”¹² These programs were modernization projects, and ideologically intertwined with many other post-World War II “state manipulations of communities of largely uneducated people.”¹³

Architects of high-modernism believed in training rural people for work in urban centres and in supporting large-scale, capitalized production in primary industries. Newfoundland’s resettlement (particularly its second phase, the Fisheries Household Resettlement Program; see Withers, Chapter 3) was a type of state-sponsored centralization that aimed to move rural populations to growth-pole communities where increased development was expected to generate spin-off industries. Smallwood’s centralization plan dovetailed with his goal to modernize the fisheries, targeting the inshore and subsistence fishers he viewed as impediments to fisheries’ modernization (symbolized by frozen-fish processing and capacity to compete with offshore foreign factory trawlers).¹⁴ State planners not only believed economic change was necessary, but also that outport people’s attitudes and habits needed transformation. By the late 1970s, resettlement had become a “lightning rod” for discontent in Newfoundland, and for the next thirty years, it was anathema to politicians.¹⁵ Yet the program was not without its successes. Blake notes that by 1972, more than 95 per cent of the population had access to road connections and electricity, and increased and varied economic opportunities offered many rural residents good year-round employment.¹⁶

Official accounts of resettlement, which begin with the 1954 centralization policy, belie the far longer history of human displacement in Labrador and the island of Newfoundland as a result

of European activity.¹⁷ Settler colonialism is a distinct form of colonialism involving the purposeful physical displacement of Indigenous peoples from their lands in the interests of settlers and as “a method of asserting ownership over land and resources.”¹⁸ By the early sixteenth century, Britain had staked its claim to the island of Newfoundland, the traditional territory of the Beothuk and Mi'kmaq, a claim that would have disastrous consequences for these populations as permanent settlement from the British Isles unfolded over subsequent centuries.¹⁹ Pre-Confederation, there are numerous examples of the deliberate relocation of Indigenous communities in both Newfoundland and Labrador. Some of these relocations had geopolitical agendas: in the 1940s, Innu and Mi'kmaw people were forced to move from their traditional lands to make way for the wartime construction of Canadian and United States air bases at Goose Bay and Stephenville, respectively.²⁰ Other relocations, such as that of the Labrador Mushuau Innu from Davis Inlet to Nutak in 1948, were carried out on the grounds of encouraging Innu “self-sufficiency.” For the Mushuau Innu, this was only the first of multiple socially and culturally destructive relocations they would experience from 1948 to 2002, before they were resettled in Natuashish as part of the federal government’s Labrador Innu Comprehensive Healing Strategy.²¹

With Confederation, the federal government, the province, and other actors including Moravian missionaries began withdrawing services from Inuit settlements north of Nain, effectively forcing their southern migration.²² This process of withdrawal culminated with the closure of communities in Nutak in 1956 and Hebron in 1959, when the provincial government abruptly shuttered the town stores and missionaries closed their missions, forcing the relocation of the Inuit who resided there.²³ These

injustices were important motivations in the 1973 formation of the Labrador Inuit Association, which ultimately secured the 2004 Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement and created the Nunatsiavut Government.²⁴ In 2005, the province formally apologized for the closure of Nutak and Hebron, acknowledging that “the closures were made without consultation” with those communities and that as “a result of the closures, and the way they were carried out, the Inuit of Nutak and Hebron experienced a variety of personal hardships and social, family and economic problems.”²⁵ Furthermore, since the 1970s, a series of hydroelectric and mining projects in Labrador, including the Churchill Falls dam in 1972, mining at Voisey’s Bay, and most recently, the Muskrat Falls project, must also be understood within the long series of development-induced displacements of Indigenous peoples in Newfoundland and Labrador, in Canada, and beyond.

Over the last decade, resettlement has once again come to the forefront of political debate in the province, revived by subsequent shifts in its resource economy. The collapse of northern cod stocks in the early 1990s prompted a moratorium that put 35,000 fishers and plant workers out of work, inducing acute and ongoing out-migration and decline across the province’s coastal communities.²⁶ After the moratorium, a transition to shellfish mitigated some of the disruptions (for example, by retrofitting former fish plants for use in crab processing), but with geographically uneven and precarious impacts. The rush to retrofit and build new crab processing plants resulted in extreme competition for crab, prompting a spatial reorganization of the relationships between fishers and crab buyers.²⁷ These shifts have once again raised the question of community closure, as communities like Little Bay Islands have more recently seen their fish plants close for good.

The CRPs reflect the government's desire to minimize the costs associated with providing services to remote communities by offering struggling remote communities compensation for community closure (see Côté and Pottie-Sherman, Chapter 4).

Newfoundland Studies scholars have underscored the significance of resettlement to the history, culture, and politics of Newfoundland and Labrador.²⁸ Our aim with this book is not to re-open old wounds and rehash old debates. As the archives adviser at The Rooms (the province's major cultural gallery) noted recently, every generation "needs different things from the past."²⁹ We find this advice especially resonant in the case of resettlement: what Newfoundland and Labrador has learned about community closure — the controversies, the opportunities, the commemorations — provide crucial testimony for governments and communities around the world that are weighing such a decision. Further, scholars in this field have not yet adequately addressed the province's new phase of resettlement (2009–present) in which resettlement has been carried out at the request of communities, implemented to mitigate the fiscal mismatch between shrinking populations and infrastructure costs.

WHY TAKE A COMPARATIVE APPROACH?

Resettlement programs in Newfoundland and Labrador represent only a small sample of ongoing or potential resettlement schemes around the world. Taking a more global view of resettlement allows us to better unpack the main rationales, actors, structures, and potential costs and benefits that underlie resettlement projects.

First, contemporary resettlement projects have many guises, intersecting with many of the major forces reshaping global relation-

ships in the twenty-first century, from economic development to geopolitics and climate change.³⁰ Development-induced displacement and resettlement — like that experienced by the Labrador Innu when their traditional lands were flooded by the Churchill Dam project in 1972 — occurs when individuals, households, or communities are directly or indirectly displaced by development projects, including hydro power and resource extraction (“mine- or dam-induced” resettlement), infrastructure construction (bridges, roads, and railway-induced resettlement), or large-scale agriculture (known as “land grab-induced” resettlement).³¹ Many of the world’s largest population resettlement schemes have accompanied the construction of new transportation and energy infrastructure,³² including the 1.4 million people who were relocated to make way for the Three Gorges Dam in China.³³ Turkey’s Ilisu Dam, the largest hydro project ever undertaken in Turkey, impacts roughly 3 million people dispersed across five provinces in Anatolia.³⁴ In Bangladesh, the Jamuna multi-purpose bridge development connecting the western and eastern halves of Bangladesh affected roughly 16,500 households totalling 100,000 people.³⁵ Agricultural development, too, continues to be a major driver of economic-oriented resettlement projects such as in Ethiopia, where the government’s “villagization” program, begun in 2010, resettled nearly all of the rural population of Gambella state to make larger pieces of land available to lease for large-scale commercial agricultural development.³⁶

In both Global North and South, urban resettlement schemes have also accompanied “world class” city ambitions.³⁷ In the lead-up to the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics, Rio de Janeiro’s municipal government embarked on a project of state-sponsored gentrification and growth acceleration. This project relocated people away from the places where the government

planned to build infrastructure for these events and was decried as a “social cleansing” project.³⁸ While the intentions of these projects may be development-oriented, the people typically displaced have been ethnic minorities or the urban poor.³⁹ In this way, these projects share commonalities with the “slum clearance” urban renewal projects that were carried out in North America, including in St. John’s, Newfoundland, during the mid-twentieth century. Sarah Manning has recently drawn parallels between development agendas in the Global South and Newfoundland and Labrador’s resettlement policy, writing that “the agenda for economic development that played out in Newfoundland, linked to perceptions of outport life as primitive or backward, closely resembles the neoliberal development agenda forced on many post-colonies in the Global South after the end of formal British colonialism.”⁴⁰

Resettlement schemes have often been geopolitically motivated or conflict-induced. During China’s Cultural Revolution (1966–75) and Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge regime (1975–78), for example, urban people were sent to be “re-educated” in the countryside in an effort to eradicate their so-called pro-bourgeois or intellectual thinking.⁴¹ In other non-democratic states, including the former Soviet Union, Laos, and Turkey, “undesirables” (e.g., prisoners), “enemies of the state,” “troublemakers,” and “risky” minorities were moved to improve national stability and cohesion.⁴² During more recent conflicts, states and armies have used resettlement schemes to remake territory and exert control over their populations,⁴³ including the Sudanese government’s forcible relocation of millions of ethnically African and non-Muslim groups throughout two civil wars.⁴⁴ Resettlement has also been requested by communities that find themselves in areas of territorial dispute, such as the Guatemalan community of Santa Rosa. Located in the

disputed “Adjacency Zone” with Belize, the village requested to relocate to Guatemalan territory in 2008.⁴⁵

Many communities worldwide are now weighing resettlement in the face of climate change due to sea-level rise, warming temperatures, and extreme weather.⁴⁶ Given their unique geographical features, islands are particularly vulnerable to evolving environmental conditions (Marshall, Chapter 7). As a result, several small island nations have recently devised demographic strategies to address these issues.⁴⁷ In Fiji, the village of Vunidogoloa asked to be resettled after a series of catastrophic weather events that made the village uninhabitable.⁴⁸ In Kiribati, rising sea levels pose a significant threat to the future existence of the country in its current location. The relocation process has begun — with the government initiating a “migration with dignity” policy for the relocation of its citizens to other countries.⁴⁹ In the Arctic, environmental changes are having a significant impact on northern communities due to rising sea levels and melting sea ice and permafrost.⁵⁰ But, as Marshall argues in Chapter 7, Indigenous peoples in Canada and the United States will have less control over climate-induced resettlement due to the nature of sovereignty within settler colonialism. Sea-level rise and melting sea ice have already significantly impacted many Alaskan villages built on permafrost and low-lying areas close to the coast or rivers, including Shishmaref and Newtok.⁵¹ These current challenges must also be understood as produced by settler colonialism. As Kyle Powys White notes, the “colonial strategies that sought to missionize, educate, and render sedentary Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, replacing the Indigenous institutions with settler ones,” have today limited the ability of communities, including Shishmaref, to adapt to environmental hazards.⁵² Further, Strauss et al. predict

that relocation induced by climate change will be necessary for 414 communities in the United States alone by 2100.⁵³ Such relocations are part of a much broader set of environmental or climate-induced migrations spurred by deforestation, natural disasters, or conservation initiatives spanning both inland and coastal contexts around the globe.⁵⁴

While resettlement schemes may be classified as economically, politically, or ecologically induced, they often have overlapping motivations. Warner argues that the ongoing dispersal of Kurdish villages in Anatolia for Turkey's Ilusu Dam project (since 1997) is driven by hydro wars with neighbouring Iraq and Syria and the government's desire to curb Kurdish mobility across these borders, as much as it is about hydropower development.⁵⁵ Similarly, in Rwanda, climate change was used as an official justification for resettling people away from the Gishwati mountainous forest after a 2007 flood. Yet, Gebauer and Dovenspeck also emphasize that resettlement furthers the Rwandan government's agenda of modernizing agriculture and protecting the country's natural resources.⁵⁶ Along similar lines, writing about small Pacific island states, Connell argues that a history of migration in combination with ongoing hardship has encouraged these states to co-opt a climate change narrative of rising sea levels in order to engender sympathy in an environmentally conscious public.⁵⁷

Despite the considerable attention paid to the political economy of resettlement globally, few scholars acknowledge that resettlement may also stem from governments' desire to minimize the costs associated with providing services to remote communities, as in the case of Newfoundland and Labrador's Community Relocation Policies. Loo labels this approach "neo-resettlement" to emphasize the role of neo-liberalism as a key driver.⁵⁸ While other

commentators note that rural communities elsewhere may be weighing community closure due to population decline or neo-liberal restructuring, we are unaware of any other government (national or subnational) that has adopted this type of policy.⁵⁹ This, in itself, is surprising, given the declining economic and political weight of rural areas worldwide.

Second, a complex multi-scalar regulatory landscape governs resettlement projects globally, involving the United Nations (i.e., the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights), national governments (and subnational ones) and their distinct laws and procedures for eminent domain and due process, international lending institutions and their standards (the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation), non-state actors including academics, religious leaders, and NGOs, as well as the resettlement project teams themselves.⁶⁰

Many institutions, scholars, and practitioners argue that resettlement projects *can* benefit communities when guided by a human rights framework.⁶¹ One key principle of this framework is that impacted communities — including vulnerable groups — must have the ability to participate meaningfully in the process at all stages, from planning to implementation to monitoring. Before resettlement planning begins, alternatives should always be considered, and people should retain access to heritage sites in their community. Overarching policy should acknowledge that resettlement projects may result in economic displacement, where people are displaced because of changes wrought by the project itself (i.e., pollution, loss of livelihood, housing costs). In light of these important repercussions for the host region, it is particularly noteworthy that local host communities rarely have the ability to participate in resettlement planning. The lack of consultations with the host communities is

not only in effect in authoritarian states like China,⁶² it is also exhibited in Louisiana, where plans to relocate the remaining 60 households of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw band were thwarted by a community nearby the chosen town site, which blocked the sale of property to Isle de Jean Charles residents.⁶³ Finally, another principle is that resettlement projects must improve the livelihoods of the relocated community. In this light, compensation must be appropriate, and must include both “land-for-land” arrangements and monetary compensation. In other words, effective resettlement necessitates comprehensive, strategic, and sustained government support to aid those affected in the transition.⁶⁴

Despite many calls among experts for a “people centred”⁶⁵ approach to resettlement, adherence to these best practices is often undermined by expediency or budgetary concerns. Around the world, resettlement projects fail to engage communities properly or to consider adequately the people who have already been displaced prior to implementation. More often than not, they also underestimate the true cost of resettlement; as Vanclay notes, “not everything is fungible.”⁶⁶ How can one put a value on non-monetized things like the loss of culture and ties to “place”? And if such loss is not recognized as legitimate, how can it be deserving of restoration?

Because of this, no matter their scale, no matter how voluntary, and no matter how perfectly resettlement projects ascribe to human rights norms, they can still cause harm. The stressors induced by resettlement are multi-dimensional and may occur at all stages of the process.⁶⁷ Their impacts and benefits are highly variegated by access to economic, social, or cultural capital, by interests, and by investment and access to land and property and ties to landscape.⁶⁸ Thus:

some people may benefit from being resettled, or at least from the project triggering the resettlement (e.g. through access to employment or business opportunities). Others may lose things they value and/or cherish dearly (e.g. memories, particular landscapes, sacred sites), for which no amount of remuneration can compensate.⁶⁹

By focusing on resettlement in Newfoundland and Labrador in comparative perspective, this volume underscores four overarching common themes: (1) the layered, historical legacies of colonialism, dispossession, and (re)settlement; (2) the agency and legitimacy of the various actors involved in the resettlement process, whether government officials, academics, religious leaders, or non-state actors; (3) the simultaneous dynamics of resistance and resilience; and (4) the role of resource dependency and extractive development in resettlement.

1. Legacies of Colonialism, Dispossession, and (Re)Settlement

Resettlement schemes have often been used as a tool of human territoriality, with human populations reorganized to serve expansionist goals, consolidate control, and rationalize territory.⁷⁰ Some states, such as China and Indonesia, have relocated populations to claim sovereignty over newly integrated territories like Tibet and Papua, respectively.⁷¹ In South Africa, under apartheid, non-white South Africans were moved to government-prescribed and -administered Bantustans in the late 1970s as part of “an attempt to rationalize the detached pieces of African occupied areas within delineated Bantustan boundaries.”⁷² An understanding of many contemporary resettlement projects begins with an understanding of colonialism, as such plans have often involved

the forcible displacement or centralization of marginalized people — national minorities or Indigenous peoples — for territorial control, legitimized by ideological superiority.

Post-war Canadian resettlement projects have occurred in both urban and rural contexts, along all three coasts. In most cases, these projects involved sovereignty, modernization, or conservation goals, often targeting Indigenous populations who, displaced for centuries through myriad colonial mechanisms, have also more recently been the targets of explicit relocation initiatives.⁷³ The Canadian government often carried out disruptive post-war resettlement schemes under the pretense of acting in the best interests of Indigenous peoples in Canada.⁷⁴ One such case involved the Sayisi Dene First Nation community, whom the state forcibly relocated to Churchill in 1956 from their traditional lands in northern Manitoba and the southern Northwest Territories.⁷⁵ The abrupt shift from a semi-nomadic life to a sedentary way of life and the loss of access to traditional means of subsistence introduced layers of social dislocation. As Ila Bussidor and Üstün Bilgen-Reinart write, the resettlement marked “the beginning of two decades of destruction and suffering. During our time at Churchill, nearly a third of the Sayisi Dene perished — many from alcohol abuse and violence. For my people, the impact of the relocation had the same effect as genocide.”⁷⁶ In the 1970s, 300 remaining members left Churchill to rebuild a new community and commenced a long process of seeking redress in the form of a relocation claim from the provincial and federal governments, finally established in 2010 and 2016.⁷⁷

As the Sayisi Dene story illustrates, any discussion of resettlement in Canada must also be informed by an understanding of settler colonialism and its structures of territorial dispossession,

which also produced treaties, the reserve system, and Indian residential schools.⁷⁸ The Canadian government designed treaties to take control of large areas of land while the reserve system restricted the mobility of Indigenous peoples and set the terms of their economic and political participation.⁷⁹ From 1879 to 1986, the residential school system removed Indigenous children from their families and traditional lands, placing them in church-run, government-funded schools apart from their families, communities, and cultures — a system that constituted “cultural genocide.”⁸⁰ As a settler colonial country, Indigenous–non-Indigenous relations in Canada continue to be structured by the legal and practical norms established by European colonialism.

The 1996 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples documents the series of relocations of Indigenous peoples in the twentieth century. Some of these forced movements were development-oriented, involving the relocation of communities to allow for industry or agriculture, such as the 1930s removal of the Métis from Ste. Madeleine, Manitoba, under the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act. There is also a substantial history of relocation related to conservation efforts and park creation in Canada involving Indigenous dispossession.⁸¹ Many of these projects had administrative goals and aimed to centralize Indigenous populations across the country and administer government programs and services, and included the relocation of the Mi'kmaq to Isakson or Shubenacadie from 20 locations around Nova Scotia; in British Columbia, the Gwa-Sala and 'Nakwaxda'wx; and in Labrador, the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet and the Inuit from Hebron.⁸²

Among the best-known of these projects, the Inuit Resettlement Project uprooted Inuit families from Inukjuak, Quebec, and Baffin Island's Pond Inlet to High Arctic settlements in Resolute

Bay (Cornwallis Bay) and on Ellesmere Island (Grise Fiord) in the 1950s to shore up Canada's control over and sovereignty claims to the High Arctic.⁸³ Such policies have had enduring legacies. As the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples underscores, the High Arctic relocation project should be viewed as "part of a broader process of dispossession and displacement, a process with lingering effects on the cultural, spiritual, social, economic, and political aspects of people's lives."⁸⁴ The enduring consequences of settler colonialism have crucial implications for any future re-settlement claims that may be made by Indigenous groups in Canada due to environmental change (see Marshall, Chapter 7).

In the United States, contemporary questions of relocation are predominantly affecting Native American and Native Alaskan communities, a pattern that reflects similar legacies of dispossession and forced migration. As Verchick argues, this pattern is "not a coincidence. Native people have rarely been able to choose the location in which they're currently living."⁸⁵ Writing about the Isle de Jean Charles resettlement project, Maldonado et al. argue that efforts to help the tribal communities adapt to sea-level rise must acknowledge that they fled to isolated parts of the Louisiana coastline in the nineteenth century to survive the Indian Removal Act and the U.S. government's forcible relocation of Indigenous people.⁸⁶ Similarly, in Alaska during World War II the US government forcibly relocated the Aleut in Alaska, and elsewhere aimed to concentrate Indigenous peoples around schools to prevent nomadic migration.⁸⁷ Research with the Isle de Jean Charles community, however, illustrates that settler colonialism is an often unacknowledged dimension of the "layering of disasters" that render places uninhabitable.⁸⁸ These legacies of forced displacement of Indigenous communities must be considered in light of

proposals to “manage” the retreat of entire communities away from the coasts of Alaska and Louisiana.⁸⁹

Globally, the breadth and depth of the social impacts of resettlement on Indigenous peoples have often been ignored while the legacies of previous resettlement projects are often not addressed.⁹⁰ Such legacies can profoundly impact the affected communities. Gilbert Islanders within the Republic of Kiribati, for example, are today contending with the realities of climate-change resettlement, alongside relatively recent memories of previous colonial resettlements. In the 1930s, British colonial authorities resettled Gilbert Islanders to the previously unsettled Phoenix Islands, a largely political manoeuvre done under the guise of mitigating overcrowding. However, the move placed the Islanders in far greater danger due to the arid conditions and high risk of drought in the Phoenix Islands. By the 1950s, many residents begged the authorities to be moved.⁹¹ This case, like that of Isle de Jean Charles, illustrates how histories of forced migration cannot be separated from contemporary attitudes towards climate-induced relocation.

The historical legacies of such “layered resettlement” were made obvious in the cases of Indigenous resettlement in Canada (see Loo, Chapter 2, and Marshall, Chapter 7). In Greenland (see Christensen and Arnfjord, Chapter 5), the post-war Danish centralization policy entailed the closure and resettlement of targeted settlements, and under Home Rule (autonomy from Denmark) resettlement continues to be used as both an overt and passive instrument to encourage urbanization. Such histories of colonial uprooting have had profound consequences for Indigenous peoples and also shape contemporary debates about resettlement.⁹²

2. The Agency and Legitimacy of State and Non-State Actors

A second important theme of this book concerns the role of government officials, academics, experts, and non-state actors in resettlement projects. Who is ultimately at the reins? With what outcomes? When resettlement has been government-led or managed, the question of voluntarism has been a contentious one. What appears to be a purely voluntary decision may contain elements of coercion.⁹³ In fact, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary resettlement is often a false dichotomy.⁹⁴ Authorities may label a resettlement voluntary in order to abrogate their responsibilities to the population and may choose to call another move involuntary in order to justify the use of force. Conversely, the role of authorities in successful resettlement where little choice is presented to those relocating is crucial to the success of the project. From their comparison of “voluntary” poverty alleviation resettlement in China and the “involuntary” resettlement associated with the Three Gorges Dam project, Wilmsen and Wang conclude that the voluntary program was more successful due to its emphasis on people-centred practices, including sustained support in helping those resettling to establish permanent communities. However, the picture was far more nuanced than a simple voluntary/involuntary split, as even within the involuntary scenario, resettlers had some choice as to where to relocate and Chinese authorities have learned to incorporate some of the successful practices from the voluntary program into the Three Gorges framework. How actors behave within these contexts is also profoundly instructive as local decision-making can shape the outcome of resettlement even within politically restrictive climates.

More often than not, resettlement programs are initiated, organized, and funded by state actors — national government

officials as in Greenland (see Christensen and Arnfjord, Chapter 5) or subnational government workers as in Newfoundland and Labrador and Quebec (see Loo, Chapter 2), or by both (see Withers, Chapter 3). Yet, what this volume makes clear is that a variety of non-state actors are also instrumental to resettlement projects, some of whom exercise a surprisingly high degree of agency and autonomy. As Loo demonstrates, academics working through Memorial University played an important role in guiding Newfoundland's first resettlement programs, a partnership that was sometimes controversial. While many scholars were sympathetic to outport residents, thus putting them at odds with the government, some were not. Academic expertise was also brought to bear in Quebec, where "an army of 75 researchers from Laval University" came up with a development plan for eastern Quebec that included the consolidation of the rural population (Loo, Chapter 2). This reliance on expert knowledge has in turn pushed out local Indigenous knowledge of the land, and silenced the relationship between people and place that this knowledge was built on (Marshall, Chapter 7). Other non-state actors have also played a role in leading resettlement programs. Looking at early resettlement in Newfoundland and Labrador, Withers, in Chapter 3, underscores how the clergy and religious leaders could determine the fate of a remote outport by closing the school or the church, thereby shaping attitudes towards resettlement. In Ireland, for instance, a small grassroots organization called Rural Resettlement Ireland has relocated hundreds of Dubliners to rural counties (Barry and Côté, Chapter 6), whereas in Greenland the non-profit sector stepped in to provide programs and services for the housing insecure, newly resettled population (Christensen and Arnfjord, Chapter 5). While the small, voluntary, and bottom-up approach of

these organizations gave them the flexibility that larger state programs would not have possessed; they also lacked the legitimacy, deep pockets, and institutional infrastructure that would come with being an organ of the state.

3. Resistance and Resilience

A large body of literature examines the resistance and contentious politics surrounding resettlement schemes in non-democratic and democratizing states.⁹⁵ With limited room for debate, control over the media, and full access to extensive financial and material resources, non-democratic states are particularly well positioned to organize population movements to promote their interests. The quasi-unfettered ability of such states to resettle large segments of their populations in turn constrains the ability of those affected by resettlement to exercise agency and control over whether or where they relocate.⁹⁶

But authoritarian states are not the only regime type that has relied on population resettlement to promote their respective agendas: democratic states have also done so over the years, fostering contention in the process. For instance, in India, the world's largest democracy, mass displacements alienated already vulnerable people from their natural sources of sustenance, resulting in stiff resistance and even violent agitations against the developmentalist policy of the Indian state.⁹⁷

Lestrelin argues that resettlement is fundamentally a "joint process" of de-territorialization and re-territorialization. The former process involves the uprooting of a population and their dislocation from the territory in which they resided, while the latter entails the relocation of the population to a new location with its own norms and socio-economic dynamics. Resistance to resettlement,

including “passive non-compliance, footdragging, and deception,” should be understood, then, as a form of counter-territorialization. As Lestrelin shows, villagers in Ban Lack Sep and Ban Done Kang in Laos have been able to resist government territorialization schemes.⁹⁸ Despite a coercive state with frequently detrimental policies, local actors engage in acts of everyday resistance and form empowering, dynamic social alliances that link various actors, institutions, and practices to present a challenge to state power. Community affiliations may have been much stronger than anticipated and override participation in state goals. Despite being separated by geographical distance, members of the original community may still engage in alliances to circumvent state-sanctioned regulations.

Along similar lines, Li et al.’s study of China’s displaced farmers also illustrates bottom-up “creative resistance” to involuntary resettlement schemes. Farmers displaced by the state’s reappropriation of collective agricultural land for urban development who move to transitional communities in the buffer zone between urban and rural areas maintain their rural lifestyles within their new communities. As these environments are not often amenable to such practices, the resettlers transform their spatial environments through “dynamic replacement, addition, superposition and permanent replacement.” Such practices represent “creative resistance from the bottom up [to] the structure enacted by authority.”⁹⁹

The chapters of this volume continue in the same vein and highlight how, even though they may take place in democratic countries and are being touted as “voluntary,” resettlement projects may contain elements of coercion (see Côté and Pottie-Sherman, Chapter 4). As we noted above, authorities may label a resettlement project voluntary to renege on their responsibilities

to the population and may choose to call another move involuntary to justify the use of force. More important is the degree to which the voluntary resettlement program incorporates people-centred practices into its mandate.¹⁰⁰ Resettlement can never be considered fully voluntary when national or subnational governments invoke eminent domain.¹⁰¹ Even when resettlement is voluntary, Lyall cautions, observers must not lose sight of the potentially coercive practices by the state, nor should they ignore the legacies of oppression and disenfranchisement that may have led to certain kinds of decision-making.¹⁰²

4. Resources, Extractive Development, and Resettlement

The state of the Newfoundland fishery looms large in any discussion of resettlement, and the global literature on resettlement also reflects natural resource development and its boom-and-bust resource geographies (see Withers, Chapter 3; Côté and Pottie-Sherman, Chapter 4).

From the Amazon to the Gulf of Mexico to the Arctic, the opening up of new spaces of oil extraction are also fuelling resettlement projects. Ecuador's Millennium Communities Resettlement scheme (*comunidad del Milenio*) involves the relocation of Indigenous Kichwa people displaced from the Amazon by oil exploration and development to a series of master-planned communities.¹⁰³ The policy emerged in response to sustained Kichwa resistance to oil development efforts by the state-owned oil company, Petroamazonas, in Sucumbios province.¹⁰⁴ After failed attempts to form an Indigenous-run oil company and a month-long period of armed resistance against Petroamazonas in 2008, Kichwa residents ultimately agreed to resettle to so-called Millennium Communities, which would be built and paid for by the oil company. The first of

these communities was completed at Playas de Cuyabeno in 2013. Designed by Petroamazonas engineers, its aesthetic mimicked the organization of the oil fields themselves. Andrade argues that the project reflects a broader “colonial matrix” in Ecuador that seeks to rationalize Indigenous communities, first through violence, and then later through social control, including the erasure of traditional architectural styles and spiritual spaces. Three other Millennium Communities have since been built (Pañacocha, Cofán Dureno, and Ciudad Jardín) and the government of Ecuador has vowed to build 200 more as part of its initiative for sustainable development and urbanization in the Amazon, although efforts have been slowed by slumping oil revenues.¹⁰⁵

Climate change-induced rises in sea level have made retreat the only adaptation available for some coastal communities and small island states (Marshall, Chapter 7). Extractive development in the Gulf of Mexico has also been a double-edged sword for low-lying coastal communities like Isle de Jean Charles. In addition to the burning of fossil fuels impacting sea-level rise through greenhouse gas emissions, which cause rising temperatures that lead to melting ice sheets and ocean thermal expansion,¹⁰⁶ offshore oil development has also involved the dredging of wetlands to create canals for the oil industry. These efforts, for example, have increased the vulnerability of Isle de Jean Charles to storm surges and coastal erosion, making the area more susceptible to catastrophic flooding.¹⁰⁷ Sea-level rise and canal dredging have led to saltwater intrusion and amplified the impact of frequent hurricanes and flooding. Oil and gas exploration in the Gulf beginning in the 1960s disrupted the tribe’s subsistence fishing and trapping-centred livelihood on the Louisiana coast via routine and dramatic oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico.¹⁰⁸ The nature of work opportunities

in extractive industries undermined social cohesion, as “working ‘on the clock’ restricts the flexible time available for community residents to be able to participate in time-honored practices of reciprocity and mutual aid.”¹⁰⁹ Additionally, regulatory changes in the Louisiana fishery disrupted the communities’ access to oyster beds for subsistence, which they now must lease (including from oil companies).¹¹⁰ In short, global oil development has contributed to combinational vulnerabilities driving the Isle de Jean Charles need for resettlement.¹¹¹ These overlapping difficulties resulted in out-migration and a threat to the people’s way of life. As Peterson and Maldonado (2016: 348) note, Isle de Jean Charles’ vulnerability must therefore be understood as “socially constructed,” and considered in the context of a “long-standing foundation of extractive-industry driven economic and political forces that more often place communities in harm’s way.”¹¹² Similar socio-economic vulnerabilities are also displayed in Greenland (Christensen and Arnfjord, Chapter 5) and in the Canadian Arctic (Marshall, Chapter 7).

Recent literature on global resettlement processes leaves us with a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon, illustrating that resettlement projects must be understood as products of the confluence of unique circumstances. Resettlement schemes often involve multi-layered agendas and competing interests, which frequently disadvantage those without a strong enough voice to counter the will of powerful authorities. Where challenges to power have been successful, local actors have frequently developed cohesive networks unified around a common goal. Moreover, challenges to official agendas can come in small, quotidian acts of resistance, which include maintaining practices and relationships from the original communities. Resettlement, then, may be seen to include human and cultural aspects as

much as economic and political dimensions. Success can only come through a thorough consideration of all the factors in play and sustained engagement with those affected.

OVERVIEW

While all resettlement programs are, to a certain degree, ingrained in their historical, social, and economic particularities, in this book we highlight points of connection, arguing that much is gained by placing Newfoundland and Labrador's resettlement projects in conversation with other contemporary resettlement cases. To do so, we adopt a multi-disciplinary approach, with nine contributors drawn from the fields of geography, history, law, and political science. Part I focuses on resettlement in Newfoundland and Labrador. Chapter 2 (Loo) contextualizes Newfoundland's resettlement history within "travelling rationalities" of community development, drawing parallels between Newfoundland and Labrador, the Arctic, and eastern Quebec. Chapter 3 (Withers) explores the agency of coastal communities during the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program (FHRP) from 1965 to 1975. In Chapter 4, Côté and Pottie-Sherman focus on the more recent Community Relocation Policies (CRPs) from 2009 to 2018, approaching the process as a negotiation of the right to "stay" (or relocate).

Part II examines resettlement in Greenland, Ireland, and Canada's Arctic. We highlight these cases because of their geographical proximity to Newfoundland and Labrador, but also because they allow us to explore layered histories of resettlement and vulnerability and the role of different kinds of actors in resettlement projects in Global North democracies. Beginning with

Chapter 5, Christensen and Arnjford review historical and contemporary processes of state-sanctioned resettlement and urbanization in the Greenlandic context, showing how resettlement projects in Greenland shape the pathways to homelessness experienced in particular by vulnerable young people and women. Then, using the case of Rural Resettlement Ireland, Barry and Côté ask in Chapter 6 how the politics around such a project change when resettlement emerges from the bottom up, suggesting that NGO-led voluntary resettlement might provide a useful way of mitigating both housing crises and rural demographic decline.

Finally, in Chapter 7, Marshall focuses on the ethical challenges surrounding climate change resettlement of Indigenous people in the Canadian Arctic. Marshall argues that sovereignty is a contextually specific concept and must be examined in Canada in connection to settler colonialism (and, hence, resting on the control/subjugation of Indigenous peoples). Contemporary (and future) climate change/environmentally induced resettlement cannot be addressed ethically without acknowledging that Arctic Indigenous communities do not have the same kind of (sovereign) autonomy to seek protection as do small island states. Marshall adopts a “capabilities approach” to show how settler-colonial notions of autonomy undermine the Inuit’s ability to be recognized as legitimate climate migrants.

NOTES

- 1 “Little Bay Islands Votes Unanimously to Resettle,” *CBC News*, 14 Feb. 2019.
- 2 “Resettlement and Amalgamation Don’t Have to Be Dirty Words, Says Financial Planner,” *CBC News*, 28 Nov. 2017; Glen Whiffen, “Newfoundland and Labrador’s Forced Resettlement a Historic Injustice, Brothers Say,” *The Telegram*, 15 Dec. 2017.

- 3 Madaline King, "A Tribe Faces Rising Tides: The Resettlement of Isle de Jean Charles," *LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources* 6, no. 1 (Fall 2017): 300.
- 4 Adam Crepelle, "The United States First Climate Relocation: Recognition, Relocation, and Indigenous Rights at the Isle de Jean Charles," *Belmont Law Review* 6, no. 1 (2019): 1–39.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 King, "A Tribe Faces Rising Tides," 295.
- 7 Victoria Herrmann, "America's First Climate Change Refugees: Victimization, Distancing, and Disempowerment in Journalistic Storytelling," *Energy Research & Social Science* 31 (2017): 205–14.
- 8 Although the term "resettlement" is often applied to the movements of refugee populations (e.g., the UN Refugee Agency), we focus instead on the resettlement of *internal* migrants within their country's borders.
- 9 Frank Vanclay, "Project-induced Displacement and Resettlement: From Impoverishment Risks to an Opportunity for Development?" *Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 35, no. 1 (2017): 6.
- 10 King, "A Tribe Faces Rising Tides."
- 11 Maritime History Archive, "'No Great Future': Government Sponsored Resettlement in Newfoundland and Labrador since Confederation" (Memorial University, 2004), <https://www.mun.ca/mha/resettlement/>.
- 12 Ralph D. Matthews, "The Smallwood Legacy: The Development of Underdevelopment in Newfoundland 1949–1972," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 13, no. 4 (1978): 98.
- 13 At mid-century, urban renewal schemes were uprooting urban populations across Canada in the name of modernity. In St. John's, a "slum clearance" agenda mandated the resettlement of poor urban communities from 1950 to 1966. This was not an isolated case, as many other perceived "problem" settlements were destroyed in North American and European cities, including the African-Canadian community of Africville, Nova Scotia, and Hogan's Alley, British Columbia, which have become symbols of the disruption wrought by urban renewal in Canada as well as the

- racial ideology underlying the high modernist “planners’ gaze.” Likewise, on the Gaspé Peninsula in eastern Quebec, people were relocated in an effort to eliminate poverty and create a “Just Society” based on people living a good life, fulfilling their potential as individuals (Loo, Chapter 2). Raymond B. Blake, *Lions or Jellyfish: Newfoundland—Ottawa Relations since 1975* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015); Tina Loo, *Moved by the State: Forced Relocation and Making a Good Life in Postwar Canada* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2019); Jennifer J. Nelson, *Razing Africville: A Geography of Racism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009); John Phyne and Christine Knott, “Outside of the Planners’ Gaze: Community and Space in the Centre of St. John’s, Newfoundland, 1945–1966,” *Sociology of Home: Belonging, Community, and Place in the Canadian Context* (2016): 167; George Withers, *Engineering Demographic Change: State Assisted Resettlement of Newfoundland Inshore Fishing Communities in the Smallwood Era* (submitted to Provincial Historic Sites Commemoration, Feb. 2012).
- 14 Blake, *Lions or Jellyfish*; Miriam Wright, *A Fishery for Modern Times: The State and the Industrialization of the Newfoundland Fishery, 1934–1968* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001).
 - 15 Blake, *Lions or Jellyfish*.
 - 16 Ibid.
 - 17 Susan M. Manning, “Contrasting Colonisations: (Re)storying Newfoundland/Ktaqmkuk as Place,” *Settler Colonial Studies* 8, no. 3 (2018): 314–31.
 - 18 Chelsea Vowell, *Indigenous Writes: A Guide to First Nations, Métis & Inuit Issues in Canada* (Winnipeg: Portage & Main Press, 2016), 16.
 - 19 Manning, “Contrasting Colonisations.”
 - 20 FemNorthNet, *Displaced from the Land. Resource Development in Northern Communities: Local Women Matter #5* (Ottawa: Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women, 2016).
 - 21 Aušra Burns, “Moving and Moving Forward: Mushuau Innu Relocation from Davis Inlet to Natuashish,” *Acadiensis* 35, no. 2 (2006): 64; Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Relocation of the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet to the New Community of

- Natuashish" (2007), <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100018932/1100100018933>.
- 22 Peter Evans, "Abandoned and Ousted by the State: The Relocations from Nutak and Hebron, 1956–1959," in *Settlement, Subsistence, and Change among the Labrador Inuit*, eds. David C. Natcher, Lawrence Felt, and Andrea Procter (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2012), 86.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 FemNorthNet, *Displaced from the Land*.
- 25 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, "Government of Newfoundland and Labrador Apologizes to Relocates" (2005), <https://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/releases/2005/exec/0122n03.htm>.
- 26 Charles Mather, "From Cod to Shellfish and Back Again? The New Resource Geography and Newfoundland's Fish Economy," *Applied Geography* 45 (2013): 402–09.
- 27 Reade Davis and Kurt Korneski, "In a Pinch: Snow Crab and the Politics of Crisis in Newfoundland," *Labour/Le Travail* (2012): 119–45.
- 28 Blake, *Lions or Jellyfish*; Maura Hanrahan, *Uncertain Refuge: Lectures on Newfoundland Society and Culture* (St. John's: Breakwater Books, 1993); Noel Iverson and Ralph Matthews, *Communities in Decline: An Examination of Household Resettlement in Newfoundland* (St. John's: ISER Books, 1968/1979); Jeff A. Webb, *Observing the Outports: Describing Newfoundland Culture, 1950–1980* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016).
- 29 Mary Ellen Wright, cited in Sarah Smellie, "Digging Through Quidi Vidi History Taught Me a Lot about Hidden Treasures in Our Archives," *CBC News*, 1 Aug. 2018.
- 30 Vanclay, "Project-induced Displacement and Resettlement."
- 31 Christopher McDowell, ed., *Understanding Impoverishment: The Consequences of Development-induced Displacement*, vol. 2 (New York: Berghahn Books, 1996); Andreas Neef and Jane Singer, "Development-induced Displacement in Asia: Conflicts, Risks, and Resilience," *Development in Practice* 25, no. 1 (2015): 601–11.
- 32 Filippo Menga, "Hydropolis: Reinterpreting the Polis in Water Politics," *Political Geography* 60 (2017): 100–09; Pham Huu Ty,

- A.C.M. Van Westen, and Annelies Zoomers, "Compensation and Resettlement Policies after Compulsory Land Acquisition for Hydropower Development in Vietnam: Policy and Practice," *Land* 2, no. 4 (2013): 678–704.
- 33 Gorild Heggelund, "Resettlement Programmes and Environmental Capacity in the Three Gorges Dam Project," *Development and Change* 37, no. 1 (2006): 179–99.
- 34 Behrooz Morvaridi, "Resettlement, Rights to Development and the Ilisu Dam, Turkey," *Development and Change* 35, 4 (2004): 719–41.
- 35 The figures for displacement by the Jamuna project are debated. Syed Al Atahar, "Development-driven Forced Displacement and Compensation-based Resettlement: Experiences from the Jamuna Multi-Purpose Bridge Project," *Development in Practice* 24, 2 (2014): 258–71.
- 36 William Davison, "Ethiopia's 'Villagisation' Scheme Fails to Bear Fruit," *The Guardian*, 22 Apr. 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/apr/22/ethiopia-villagisation-scheme-fails>.
- 37 Sejal Patel, Richard Sliuzas, and Navdeep Mathur, "The Risk of Impoverishment in Urban Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement in Ahmedabad," *Environment and Urbanization* 27, no. 1 (2015): 231–56.
- 38 Fernanda Sánchez and Anne-Marie Broudehoux, "Mega-Events and Urban Regeneration in Rio de Janeiro: Planning in a State of Emergency," *International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development* 5, no. 2 (2013): 132–53.
- 39 Al Atahar, "Development-driven Forced Displacement"; Leopoldo J. Bartolome, "Forced Resettlement and the Survival Systems of the Urban Poor," *Ethnology* 23, 3 (1984): 177–92; Morvaridi, "Resettlement, Rights to Development and the Ilisu Dam, Turkey"; Ty et al., "Compensation and Resettlement Policies."
- 40 Manning, "Contrasting Colonisations."
- 41 Kosal Path and Angeliki Kanavou, "Converts, Not Ideologues? The Khmer Rouge Practice of Thought Reform in Cambodia, 1975–1978," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 20, no. 3 (2015): 304–32.

- 42 Ian G. Baird and Bruce Shoemaker, "Unsettling Experiences: Internal Resettlement and International Aid Agencies in Laos," *Development and Change* 38, no. 5 (2007): 865–88; Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Morvaridi, "Resettlement, Rights to Development and the Ilisu Dam, Turkey."
- 43 Bart Klem, "The Political Geography of War's End: Territorialisation, Circulation, and Moral Anxiety in Trincolmalee, Sri Lanka," *Political Geography* 38 (2014): 33–45; Nigel Parsons and Mark B. Salter, "Israeli Biopolitics: Closure, Territorialisation and Governmentality in the Occupied Palestinian Territories," *Geopolitics* 13, no. 4 (2008): 701–23.
- 44 Jok Madut Jok, *War and Slavery in Sudan* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).
- 45 Janelle Conaway, "A New Home," *Americas* 60, no. 2 (2008): 53.
- 46 Michael Cernea and Julie Maldonado, eds., *Challenging the Prevailing Paradigm of Displacement and Resettlement* (New York: Routledge, 2018); A. de Sherbinin et al., "Preparing for Resettlement Associated with Climate Change," *Science* 334, no. 6055 (2011): 456–57; Karen E. McNamara and Helene J. Des Combes, "Planning for Community Relocations due to Climate Change in Fiji," *International Journal for Disaster Risk Science* 6, no. 3 (2015): 315–19.
- 47 M.M. Naser, *Assessing the Evidence: Migration, Environment, and Climate Change in Papua New Guinea* (Grand-Saconnex, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 2015), 11.
- 48 K.E. McNamara and H.J. des Combes, *Planning for Community Relocations due to Climate Change in Fiji* (Grand-Saconnex, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 2015).
- 49 K.E. McNamara, "Cross-border Migration with Dignity in Kiribati," *Forced Migration Review* 49 (2015): 62.
- 50 L.C. Hamilton, K. Saito, P.A. Loring, R.B. Lammers, and H.P. Huntington, "Climigration? Population and Climate Change in Arctic Alaska," *Population and Environment* 38, no. 2 (2016): 115–33.
- 51 Ibid.
- 52 Kyle Powys Whyte, "Is It Colonial Déjà Vu? Indigenous Peoples

- and Climate Injustice,” in *Humanities for the Environment: Integrating Knowledges, Forging New Constellations of Practice*, eds. J. Adamson and M. Davis (New York: Routledge, 2016), 88–104;
- Elizabeth Marine, “The Long History of Environmental Migration: Assessing Vulnerability Construction and Obstacles to Successful Relocation in Shishmaref, Alaska,” *Global Environmental Change* 22, no. 2 (2012): 374–81.
- 53 Benjamin H. Strauss, Scott Kulp, and Anders Levermann, “Carbon Choices Determine US Cities Committed to Futures Below Sea Level,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 112, no. 44 (2015): 13508–13.
- 54 C. Gebauer and M. Doevenspeck, “Adaptation to Climate Change and Resettlement in Rwanda,” *Area* 47, no. 1 (2015): 97–104.
- 55 J. Warner, “The Struggle over Turkey’s Ilisu Dam: Domestic and International Security Linkages,” *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 12, no. 3 (2012): 231–50.
- 56 Gebauer and Doevenspeck, “Adaptation to Climate Change.”
- 57 John Connell, “Losing Ground? Tuvalu, the Greenhouse Effect and the Garbage Can,” *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 44, no. 2 (2003): 89–107; John Connell, “Last Days in the Carteret Islands? Climate Change, Livelihoods and Migration on Coral Atolls,” *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 57, no. 1 (2016): 3–15.
- 58 Tina Loo, “‘The Government Game:’ Resettlement Then and Now,” *Canadian History and Policy, Active History*, 16 June 2013, <http://activehistory.ca/2013/06/the-government-game-resettlement-then-and-now/>; see also John C. Kennedy, *Encounters: An Anthropological History of Southeastern Labrador* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015).
- 59 Michael Isaac Stein, “Moving a Louisiana Town Out of the Path of Climate Change,” *CityLab*, 24 Jan. 2018; Vanclay, “Project-induced Displacement and Resettlement.”
- 60 Vanclay, “Project-induced Displacement and Resettlement.”
- 61 King, “A Tribe Faces Rising Tides”; Gerry Reddy, Eddie Smyth, and Michael Steyn, *Land Access and Resettlement: A Guide to Best Practice* (Sheffield, UK: Greenleaf, 2015); Lidewij van der Ploeg and Frank

- Vanclay, "Challenges in Implementing the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights in the Context of Project-induced Displacement and Resettlement," *Resources Policy* 55 (2018): 210–22.
- 62 Isabelle Côté, "Horizontal Inequalities and Sons of the Soil Conflict in China", *Civil Wars* 17, no. 3 (2015): 357–78.
- 63 King, "A Tribe Faces Rising Tides."
- 64 Kevin Lo, Longyi Xue, and Mark Wang, "Spatial Restructuring through Poverty Alleviation Resettlement in Rural China," *Journal of Rural Studies* 47 (2016): 496–505; Brooke Wilmsen and Mark Wang, "Voluntary and Involuntary Resettlement in China: A False Dichotomy?" *Development in Practice* 25, no. 5 (2015): 612–27.
- 65 Gezahegn Zewdie, Abebe, and Jan Hesselberg, "Community Participation and Inner-city Slum Renewal: Relocated People's Perspectives on Slum Clearance and Resettlement in Addis Ababa," *Development in Practice* 25, no. 4 (2015): 560; Wilmsen and Wang, "Voluntary and Involuntary Resettlement in China."
- 66 Vanclay, "Project-induced Displacement and Resettlement."
- 67 Reddy, Smyth, and Steyn, *Land Access and Resettlement*; Thayer Scudder, *The Future of Large Dams: Dealing with Social, Environmental and Political Costs* (London: Earthscan, 2005).
- 68 King, "A Tribe Faces Rising Tides."
- 69 Vanclay, "Project-induced Displacement and Resettlement," 3.
- 70 Klem, "The Political Geography of War's End"; Peter Vandergeest and Nancy Lee Peluso, "Territorialization and State Power in Thailand," *Theory and Society* 24, no. 3 (1995): 385–426.
- 71 Greg Rohlf, "Dreams of Oil and Fertile Fields: The Rush to Qinghai in the 1950s," *Modern China* 29, no. 4 (2003): 455–89.
- 72 Luvuyo Wotshela, "Territorial Manipulation in Apartheid South Africa: Resettlement, Tribal Politics and the Making of the Northern Ciskei, 1975–1990," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004): 318.
- 73 Julia Christensen, "Our Home, Our Way of Life: Spiritual Homelessness and the Sociocultural Dimensions of Indigenous Homelessness in the Northwest Territories (NWT), Canada," *Social & Cultural Geography* 14, no. 7 (2013): 804–28; Pamela D. Palmater, "Genocide,

- Indian Policy, and Legislated Elimination of Indians in Canada,” *Aboriginal Policy Studies* 3, no. 3 (2014): 27–54.
- 74 Paulette Regan, *Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, Truth Telling, and Reconciliation in Canada* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), 79.
- 75 Ila Bussidor and Üstün Bilgen-Reinart, *Night Spirits: The Story of the Relocation of the Sayisi Dene* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1997).
- 76 *Ibid.*, 4.
- 77 Sayisi Dene First Nation, Relocation Settlement Trust, <http://sdfntrust.ca/history/>.
- 78 Glen Sean Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 388.
- 79 Caroline Desbiens and Carole Lévesque, “From Forced Relocation to Secure Belonging: Women Making Native Space in Quebec’s Urban Areas,” *Historical Geography* 44 (2016): 91; James S. Frideres, Madeline A. Kalbach, and Warren E. Kalbach, “Government Policy and the Spatial Redistribution of Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples,” in *Population Mobility and Indigenous Peoples in Australasia and North America*, eds. John Taylor and Martin Bell (New York: Routledge, 2004), 96.
- 80 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) found that the residential schools and their practices of uprooting children and forcibly separating them from Indigenous language, customs, and traditional lands, along with systematic abuse, constituted “cultural genocide.” TRC, *Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada* (Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015), 1.
- 81 Desirée Valadares, “Dispossessing the Wilderness: Contesting Canada’s National Park Narrative,” in *Cultural Contestation: Heritage, Identity and the Role of Government*, eds. Jeroen Rodenberg and Pieter Wagenaar (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 139–53;

- Theodore (Ted) Binnema and Melanie Niemi, "‘Let the Line Be Drawn Now’: Wilderness, Conservation, and the Exclusion of Aboriginal People from Banff National Park in Canada," *Environmental History* 11, no. 4 (2006): 724–50; Mark David Spence, *Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making of the National Parks* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- 82 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), *Final Report*, vol. I, *Looking Forward, Looking Back*, Chapter 11, "Relocation of Aboriginal Communities" (Ottawa: RCAP, 1996), <http://caid.ca/RRCAP1.11.pdf>.
- 83 Shelagh D. Grant, "Errors Exposed: Inuit Relocations to the High Arctic, 1953–1960," *Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security*, no. 8 (2016); RCAP, *Final Report*, vol. 1, "The High Arctic Relocation. Summary of Supporting Information," http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/aanc-inac/Z1-1991-1-41-3-1-eng.pdf.
- 84 RCAP, *Final Report*, vol. 1, Chapter 11.
- 85 Robert Verchick, cited in Michael Isaac Stein, "How to Save a Town from Rising Waters," *CityLab*, 24 Jan. 2018, <https://www.citylab.com/environment/2018/01/how-to-save-a-town-from-rising-waters/547646/>.
- 86 Julie K. Maldonado et al., "The Impact of Climate Change on Tribal Communities in the U.S.: Displacement, Relocation, and Human Rights," *Climatic Change* 120, no. 3 (2013): 601–14.
- 87 Karen Hesse, *Aleutian Sparrow* (New York: Margaret K. McElderry Books, 2005).
- 88 Lowlander Center, *Isle de Jean Charles Resettlement* (2018); Kristina J. Peterson and Julie K. Maldonado, "When Adaptation Is Not Enough: Between the 'Now and Then' of Community-led Resettlement," in *Anthropology and Climate Change: From Actions to Transformations*, eds. S.A. Crate and M. Nuttal (New York: Routledge, 2016), 336–72.
- 89 Nicole Marshall, "Forced Environmental Migration: Ethical Considerations for Emerging Migration Policy," *Ethics, Policy, & Environment* 19, no. 1 (2016): 1–18; Liz Koslov, "The Case for

- Retreat,” *Public Culture* 28, no. 2 (2016): 359–87.
- 90 Vanclay, “Project-induced Displacement and Resettlement.”
- 91 Eberhard Weber, “Only a Pawn in Their Games? Environmental (?) Migration in Kiribati — Past, Present and Future,” *DIE ERDE — Journal of the Geographical Society of Berlin* 147, no. 2 (2016): 153–64.
- 92 Ibid.
- 93 Isabelle Côté and Yolande Pottie-Sherman, “The Contentious Politics of Resettlement Programs: Evidence from Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 1 (2020): 19–37.
- 94 Wilmsen and Wang, “Voluntary and Involuntary Resettlement in China.”
- 95 T. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001); Brooke Wilmsen and M. Webber, “Mega Dams and Resistance: The Case of the Three Gorges Dam, China,” in *Demanding Justice in the Global South*, eds. J. Grugel, J. Singh, L. Fontana, and A. Uhlin (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 69–98.
- 96 Côté, “Horizontal Inequalities and Sons of the Soil Conflict in China.”
- 97 Mahendra P. Lama, “Internal Displacement in India: Causes, Protection and Dilemmas,” *Forced Migration Review* 8 (2000), <https://www.fmreview.org/accountability-and-displacement/lama>;
- R.N. Sharma, “Changing Facets of Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement in India,” *Social Change* 40, no. 4 (2010): 503–24.
- 98 Guillaume Lestrelin, “Rethinking State–Ethnic Minority Relations in Laos: Internal Resettlement, Land Reform, and Counter-territorialization,” *Political Geography* 30, no. 6 (2011): 311–19.
- 99 Yuhang Li, Hans Westlund, Xiaoyu Zheng, and Yansui Liu, “Bottom-up Initiatives and Revival in the Face of Rural Decline: Case Studies from China and Sweden,” *Journal of Rural Studies* 47 (2016): 506–13.
- 100 Wilmsen and Wang, “Voluntary and Involuntary Resettlement in China.”
- 101 King, “A Tribe Faces Rising Tides.”
- 102 Angus Lyall, “Voluntary Resettlement in Land Grab Contexts:

- Examining Consent on the Ecuadorian Oil Frontier,” *Urban Geography* 38, no. 7 (2017): 958–73.
- 103 Matthew Bozigar, Clark L. Gray, and Richard E. Bilborrow, “Oil Extraction and Indigenous Livelihoods in the Northern Ecuadorian Amazon,” *World Development* 88 (2016): 125–35; Michael A. Uzendoski, “Amazonia and the Cultural Politics of Extractivism: Sumak Kawsay and Block 20 of Ecuador,” *Cultural Studies* 32, no. 3 (2018): 364–88.
- 104 Alejandra Espinosa Andrade, “Space and Architecture of Extractivism in the Ecuadorian Amazon Region,” *Cultural Studies* 31, 2 (2017): 307–30.
- 105 Lyall, “Voluntary Resettlement in Land Grab Contexts”; Japhy Wilson and Manuel Bayón, “Millennium Cities: Staging the Origins of Twenty-first Century Socialism,” Working Paper #7, CENEDET, Feb. 2016, <https://cenedet.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/cenedet-wp7.pdf>.
- 106 Aimee B.A. Slangen, John A. Church, Cecile Agosta, Xavier Fettweis, Ben Marzeion, and Kristin Richter, “Anthropogenic Forcing Dominates Global Mean Sea-Level Rise Since 1970,” *Nature Climate Change* 6 (2016): 701–05.
- 107 Julie K. Maldonado, “A Multiple Knowledge Approach for Adaptation to Environmental Change: Lessons Learned from Coastal Louisiana’s Tribal Communities,” *Journal of Political Ecology* 21, no. 1 (2014): 61–82.
- 108 Peterson and Maldonado, “When Adaptation Is Not Enough.”
- 109 *Ibid.*, 342.
- 110 Julie K. Maldonado, “Everyday Practices and Symbolic Forms of Resistance,” in *Hazards, Risks, and Disasters in Society*, eds. Andrew E. Collins, Samantha Jones, Bernard Manyena, and Janaka Jayawickrama (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 2015), 203.
- 111 Maldonado, “A Multiple Knowledge Approach.”
- 112 Peterson and Maldonado, “When Adaptation Is Not Enough,” 348.